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Note: Plea Bargaining-Proposed Amendments to
Federal Criminal Rule 11
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of plea bargaining within the courts of criminal
justice is an ancient custom. It sprang from attempts to mitigate
the harsh punishments of seventeenth century English courts,'
and its use today often flows from the same motivation. 2 How-
ever, it has never been accepted as a rightful part of the federal
trial process, but rather as a necessary evil below the dignity of
the court, carried on with neither official recognition nor ap-
proval.
In 1971 the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules of the
Judicial Conference of the United States submitted proposed re-
visions to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including a
new provision in Rule 11 recognizing the propriety of plea bar-
gaining and setting forth a procedure for its implementation.
This note will examine the present and proposed Rule 11, ex-
plore the revisions and additions proposed by the Committee and
submit two additional proposals for consideration.
II. PRESENT RULE 11
Rule 11 now provides that a defendant may plead not guilty,
guilty, or nolo contendere. The court has the power to reject a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere and must not accept either with-
out first determining from the defendant that the plea is volun-
tarily and understandingly made, and that there is a factual basis
for the plea.3 The present rule was revised in 1966 to incorporate
1. J. HALL, THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY 68 et seq. (1935).
2. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR IN-
NOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 77 (1966).
3. FED. R. CriM. P., Rule 11:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of
court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea ofguilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere
without first addressing the defendant personally and determin-
ing that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a
defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea
of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court
shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter ajudgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there
is a factual basis for the plea.
The requirement that the court must determine that "there is a factual
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into the Federal Rules the teachings of recent appellate court de-
cisions on guilty plea procedures.4 These 1966 revisions were an
attempt to insure that the guilty plea was based on an informed
decision. They also, for the first time, required the court to satis-
fy itself of a factual basis for the plea.5
Current Rule 11 not only protects the defendant by lessening
the dangers of a coerced plea, but also protects the judicial pro-
cess from the expense of time and money on frivolous appeals.
By protecting the defendant from coercion, the system may also
make him more receptive to the correctional process.6
H. PROPOSED RULE 11
Even though the 1966 revision of Rule 11 was explained and
amplified by court decisions, the need for even more explicit
guidelines became clear. In response to that need, proposed Rule
11 contains two nearly distinct provisions: one applying recent
court decisions to the current provisions of Rule 11, and the other
creating a procedure for recognizing and implementing court-
approved plea bargaining.
A. PROPOSALS TO CLARIFY CURRENT RuLE 11 PRAcTIcES
Proposed Rule 11 makes explicit the responsibility of the
judge to personally address the defendant in open court, "inform-
ing him [of] and determining that he understands"- the nature of
the charge, the range of punishment, and the waiver of Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights that accompany a guilty plea.
The requirement that the judge personally address the defen-
dant is included in current Rule 11; the proposed change adds
basis for the plea" means that the court must believe that the facts point
to the defendant's guilt.
4. The primary decisions embodied in the new rule were Machi-
broda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) (a guilty plea must be freely,
knowingly, and understandingly made in order to be valid), and Kadwell
v. United States, 315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1963) (specification of that which
is required of a judge under Rule 11).
5. See note 28 infra.
6. For further discussion of the impact and basis for the 1966 re-
vision, see Note, Offical Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals
for a Marketplace, 32 U. CHu. L. REv. 167 (1964); Comment, To Plea or
Not to Plea, 7 SAx DIEGO L. REv. 90 (1970).
7. Proposed Rule 11(c). [All references in this note to proposed
rules are drawn from JInIciAL CONFERENCE or =s UNmTmD STATE, PRE-
nivqARy DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMwEDmENTS To TaE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIINAL PROCEDURE FOR TE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1971)
(also set out at 52 F.R.D. 409 (1971)).]
19721
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"in open court." After the 1966 revision, controversy developed
over how closely the judge must follow the prescribed ritual to
avoid reversible error. In 1969 this question was settled when
the United States Supreme Court held in McCarthy v. United
States8 that Rule 11 requirements were to be read strictly and
literally.9 The Court emphasized that Rule 11 is to provide pro-
cedural safeguards for the defendant and to insure a full and
adequate record for rapid disposition of cases on appeal.'0 The
additional requirement that such determination must take place
"in open court" furthers both purposes. It insures that the
determination occurs before a judge at a formal proceeding,
rather than in judge's chambers or other informal encounter.
Proposed Rule 11 (c) (1) provides that the judge must inform
the defendant and determine that he understands "the nature of
the charge to which the plea is offered." A similar provision ex-
ists in current Rule 11, and such a requirement has been a con-
tinuing part of English and American law. 1 The United States
Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation."'1 2 This right, most recently affirmed by
the Supreme Court in McCarthy v. United States,' 8 allows the
defendant to prepare a defense and to protect himself from the
danger of double jeopardy.
While current Rule 11 provides that the defendant be inform-
ed of the "consequences" of his plea, the proposed rule drops this
general term and instead specifies what the consequences are
and how they are to be explained to the defendant.1 4 The court
is to inform and determine that the defendant understands the
the mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and the maximum
possible punishment provided by the statute defining the offense
to which the plea is offered .... 15
8. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
9. Id. at 463-64.
10. Id. at 465.
11. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101-02, 111-12 (1908).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. 394 U.S. 459 (1969). The courts have adopted the language of
the Constitution when describing this requirement, and Rule 11 reflects
the language in which this fundamental right traditionally has been
couched.
14. Under the present rule, the judge may determine that the de-
fendant's attorney has informed him of the nature of the charge and
consequences of the plea. Proposed Rule 11 would eliminate this prac-
tice, since the court is to inform as well as to determine that the defend-
ant understands.
15. Proposed Rule 11(c)(2).
[Vol. 56:718
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The impetus for this change came from the Supreme Court's
decision in Boykin v. Alabama.'0 Although the decision did not
explicitly set out these requirements, the majority held that the
same standards for waiver of right to counsel, i.e., intelligent and
voluntarily waiver, "must be applied to determining whether a
guilty plea is voluntarily made."' 7 By extending the waiver-of-
counsel test into this area the Court brought to bear past decisions
on waiver of counsel standards such as Von Moltke v. Gillies,'8
where the Court held that for a waiver to be valid, a judge must
provide information on the "nature of the charge, the statutory
offenses included within them, [and] the range of allowable
punishments thereunder."'19 Thus the Advisory Committee has
incorporated requirements into the guilty plea procedure which
originated as courts broadened waiver-of-council requirements.
The proposed rule, however, is silent on any requirement that
the judge inform the defendant about parole eligibility, applica-
tions of recidivist statutes2 0 and possible deportation conse-
quences. Although the Advisory Committee notes that parole
eligibility often involves difficult and complicated determinations
which may be made only after seeing a presentence report,2 1 no
such problem exists in informing the defendant of the possible
application of recidivist statutes.22  Some appellate courts have
held that such information must be given.2 3 Lack of such a provi-
sion renders Subsection (2) meaningless in cases where the
court, in advising defendant of the maximum sentence for a spe-
cific offense, fails to mention the fact that it may be doubled if he
is subject to a repeater statute. Informing the defendant of the
possible effects of a guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere on
eligibility for deportation also should be required under proposed
Rule 11 (c) because under present case law either plea results
in a conviction that will activate deportation statutes.2 4
16. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
17. Id. at 242.
18. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
19. Id. at 724.
20. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1968) (unlawful possession or receipt of
firearms).
21. Although proposed Rule 32 would allow the judge to examine
the presentence report prior to the acceptance or rejection of the plea,
requiring the judge to determine each defendant's parole eligibility status
could constitute a major drain on court time.
22. A general caution delivered by the judge on the possible effect
of recidivist statutes, whenever the judge felt such a statute would apply,
would adequately warn the defendant and his counsel.
23. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 426 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1970);
Gannon v. United States, 208 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1953).
24. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1952) (deportable aliens); Ruis-Rubio v.
1972]
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Subsections (3) and (4) of proposed Rule 11 (c), which pro-
vide that the defendant be informed of the constitutional rights
he is waiving by pleading guilty, also flow from the Supreme
Court's decision in Boykin v. Alabama.25 Subsections (3) and (4)
of the proposed Rule state that the court is required to inform
and determine that the defendant understands:
(3) that the defendant has the right to plead not quilty, or to
persist in that plea if it has already been made, or to plead
guilty; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be
a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty he waives
the right to a trial by jury or otherwise and the right to be con-
fronted with witnesses against him. 26
Subsection (3) is designed to provide an explanation to the de-
fendant of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and of the
burden of proof of guilt on the prosecution, while Subsection (4)
is designed to require an explanation to the defendant of the
waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to trial and the right to be
confronted by witnesses against him.
Proposed Rule 11 (d) expands the requirement of the current
rule that the plea be "voluntary:" the proposal identifies factors
such as force, threat or promises which would render the plea
involuntary. The proposal specifies further, however, that prom-
ises resulting in plea agreements do not render the plea involun-
tary. Although these provisions clearly express the Advisory
Committee's premise 27 that plea bargains (designated by the
Committee as "plea agreements") do not in themselves render the
plea involuntary, it and the rest of proposed Rule 11 (d) provide
little guidance to the judge who must examine the voluntariness
of a plea and then determine if the plea is acceptable.
Like the current rule, proposed Rule 11 includes a require-
ment that the judge must be satisfied of a factual basis for the
plea.2 8
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 380 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1967); Tseung
Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957).
25. 395 U.S. 238 (1959).
26. Proposed Rule 11 (c).
27. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE. OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 7, at 9(Advisory Comm. Note).
28. Proposed Rule 11 (f): Determining the Accuracy of Plea.
One of the primary reasons for this requirement is to avoid the
possibility of an innocent defendant being convicted on a guiltyplea. This could result from defendant's erroneous belief that
his conduct constituted a crime, or a conscious choice to protecthimself from the risks of trial or to protect others from prose-
cution or shame. The specter of the innocent defendant has longbeen raised in discussions of plea bargaining, particularly by
[Vol. 56:718
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B. PROPOSALS TO BRING THE PLEA AGREEMENT INTO THE COURTROOM
The most significant change contained in proposed Rule 11 is
its provision making plea bargaining a recognized part of criminal
justice. Proposed Rule 11 (d) states the basic proposition: the
plea must be "voluntary and not the result of force or threats or
of promises apart from a plea agreement." Proposed Rule 11 (e)
sets forth a plea agreement procedure and thereby lends the re-
spectability of precise rules to what has heretofore existed as a
largely sub rosa practice.
Plea bargaining has been the subject of extensive study, and
the debate over its use has grown in recent years. The propriety
of a practice which has existed without formal guidelines and has
been carried on behind closed doors has long concerned legal
scholars.29 Beyond the issue of propriety of plea bargaining,
those who believe that plea bargaining may coerce an innocent
defendant into a plea of guilty.
This requirement of determination of a factual basis for a guilty plea
does not extend to the plea of nolo contendere. The Advisory Committee
note to the 1966 revision comments that for various reasons it is some-
times advisable to allow this plea without an inquiry into its factual
basis.
The actual extent of such false guilty pleas remains unknown. See
Comment, Voluntary False Confessions: A Neglected Area in Criminal
Administration, 28 IND. L.J. 374 (1953). However, some commentators
believe the problem has been exaggerated and argue that the critics are
wrong. For example, it has been stated that the significant question is
not how many people may be induced to plead guilty, but whether there
is a significant likelihood that innocent defendants who would be
(or have a fair chance of being) acquitted at trial might be induced to
plead guilty. It is also suggested that this problem is not likely to occur
because the defense attorney must cooperate to have a guilty plea en-
tered, while a defendant may be convicted at trial despite his attorney's
belief in his innocence. Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, PRESI-
DENT'S CoxmnissIoN ON LAW ENFoRcEMENT AND THE ADMINSTRATION OF
JusTcE, TASK FORCE ON ADMnISTRATION OF JusTicE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE CouRTs 108, 113 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FoncE REPORT].
The most common situation in which a false guilty plea arises is
when a plea is offered to a lesser included offense in a sexual crime to
avoid publicity and the humiliation of a trial. Although such pleas may
be false, most commentators agree that such pleas should be allowed.
See, e.g., id.
Appellate courts normally allow trial judges discretion in accepting
such pleas, and the United States Supreme Court has held that an actual
admission of guilt is not constitutionally required. North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). Other cases have upheld the defendant's
right to choose to plead guilty to a crime he did not actually commit.
See, e.g., McCoy v. United States 363 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
A few states have forbidden guilty pleas to be entered in capital
cases because of their concern with false guilty pleas. See CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 8 (1954); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A § 113-3 (1953); N.Y. CODE CraM.
PRoc. § 332 (McKinney 1968).
29. E.g., Folberg, The "Bargained-For" Guilty Plea-An Evaluation,
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scholars have seen a more basic question: is plea bargaining so
inherently coercive that it always renders a guilty plea involun-
tary and hence unacceptable? The courts and commentators have
discussed this problem at length, and the weight of opinion con-
cludes that although some plea bargaining techniques and
practices may be so coercive as to render the plea involuntary,
the process itself is not inherently coercive.30
Because these issues of propriety and coercion, as well as
the problems3 1 and benefits 32 of plea bargaining, have been ex-
4 CRIM. L. BULL. 201, 206 (1968). Folberg argues that it breeds misuse
by both prosecutors and criminal lawyers. Prosecutors use it for weak
cases and criminal lawyers too often disregard the best interest of their
clients. He suggests that the practice would wither and die if exposed
to the full view of court and public.
On the other hand, the Task Force Report presents a different per-
spective on the low visibility of plea agreements. Visibility is a matter of
point of view, Enker suggests. While the current practice may be in-
visible to the court and public, it is highly visible to the defendant. By
being given a role in the process of selecting his punishment, a de-
fendant may not only feel less angry and frustrated at a highly im-
personal process, but may be more receptive to rehabilitation. TASK
FORcE REPORT, supra note 28, at 115.
For a good discussion of the problem, see Newman & NeMoyer,
Issues of Propriety in Negotiated Justice, 47 DENVER L.J. 367 (1970).
30. The strongest argument against the inherent coerciveness of
plea bargaining is that "[t]he conclusion that plea bargaining is un-
constitutional depends on the determination that it exacts a price for
the exercise of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights." Note, The Uncon-
stitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. Rav. 1387, 1400 (1970). The
courts, however, have consistently refused to support this position. Al-
though the United States Supreme Court struck down a provision of the
Federal Kidnapping Act which arguably induced a plea agreement by
its provision that a death penalty may be imposed only after a jury trial
(United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)), the Court has refused
to strike down similar state legislation, holding it not to be inherently
coercive and not to have been coercive in the particular plea agreement
before the Court. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Brady the Court stated: "We
cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit
to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State."
397 U.S. at 753.
Federal and state appellate courts have held repeatedly that plea
bargains are not inherently coercive. See Parrish v. Beto, 414 F.2d 770
(5th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721 (2d
Cir. 1968); Rogers v. Wainwright, 394 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1968); Litton
v. Beto, 386 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1967); Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950 (5th
Cir. 1967); Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1964); Note,
Plea Bargaining-Justice Off the Record, 9 WAsHBuRN L.J. 430, 432 n.
14 (1970).
31. The problems of plea bargaining generally pointed out by legal
scholars and courts are dangers of inaccuracy (see note 28 supra), the
creation of unreliable conviction records, the inequality of opportunity
among defendants to negotiate pleas (see note 71 infra), a general loss
[Vol. 56:718
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tensively discussed elsewhere, this note will not join the debate.
Rather it simply will accept the proposition that plea bargaining
is not inherently coercive, and, if properly safeguarded, can be
an appropriate part of the system of criminal justice.33
The proposed additions to Rule 11 are a response to the wide-
spread use of plea agreements where there are no guidelines for
court or prosecutor. Prosecutors in the United States have bar-
gained with defendants and their counsel for at least the greater
of judicial integrity and a growth in the defendant's cynicism. See
generally Gentile, Fair Bargains and Accurate Pleas, 49 B.U.L. R-v. 514
(1969); Folberg, supra note 29; Newman & NeMoyer, supra note 29; TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 9.
One side effect of guilty pleas and plea negotiations is that due proc-
ess questions get no consideration. Since a guilty plea acts as a con-
viction so that the defendant never reaches the trial stage of proceedings,
any evidentiary objections are waived. Some scholars view this result
with alarm when they see the prosecutor bargaining cases in which
police tactics make evidence unusable and which results in the courts
being denied the chance to oversee police behavior. See Oaks & Lehman,
The Criminal Process of Cook County and the Indigent Defendant, 1966
U. OF ILL. L.F. 584, 657 (1966). "What the due process revolution will
have gained is simply shorter sentences." Id. at 657. See also United
States ex rel. Glenn v. McMann, 349 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1965); Watts v.
United States, 278 F.2d 247, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
32. Aside from the obvious value of saving the state time and money
by avoiding trial, scholars have argued that plea bargaining makes a
positive contribution to the system of criminal justice. Advantages
urged for the system include protecting the integrity of the jury trial
by preventing too many trials which would push jaded juries into pre-
sumptions of guilt; aiding the rehabilitation system by furnishing to it
defendants who had confessed and therefore taken a first step in self-
punishment, as well as by clearing the courts quickly so that others may
have a quicker-and therefore more effective--encounter with punish-
ment; saving the victim the embarrassment of testifying at a public trial,
particularly in certain types of personal attack crimes; and providing
the system with a more flexible means of fitting the punishment to the
individual defendant. See D. NE An", supra note 2, at 39, 77, 129; TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 11; Newman & NeMoyer, supra note 29;
Note, supra note 30, at 433; Note, The Role of Plea Negotiation in Modern
Criminal Law, 46 Cm-KErr L. REv. 116 (1969).
33. This view has been supported by the recent Supreme Court de-
cision, Santobello v. New York, 405 U.S. 251 (1971). While holding that
prosecutors must keep plea agreements with defendants, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, stated:
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the
prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called plea
bargaining, is an essential component of the administration ofjustice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. Disposi-
tion of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential
part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons.
Id. at 261. The AsEIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MnvMnuM STAND-
ARDS FOR CRInvIAL JUsTIcE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS oF GuiLTY (Ap-
proved Draft, 1968), has also adopted this view.
1972]
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part of this century,3 4 and the practice today is widespread. It
is estimated that guilty pleas account for 90 per cent of all con-
victions and perhaps 95 per cent of misdemeanor convictions."
Authorities believe a substantial proportion of these are the
result of plea agreements."0
Proposed Rule 11 (e) (1) provides:
The attorney for the government and the attorney for the de-
fendant may engage in discussions with a view toward reach-
ing an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related
offense, the attorney for the government will move for a dis-
missal of other charges, or will recommend or not oppose the
imposition of a particular sentence, or will do both. The court
shall not participate in any such discussions.
In these provisions authorizing 37 plea bargaining, all of the
34. It is uncertain when the use of plea bargaining began in the
United States.
[S]tatistical studies indicate that it would be quite impossible to
conduct the criminal business of the Federal Court without
something which can only be distinguished from bargaining by
logical hairsplitting.
Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J.
1, 10 (1932). Although the criticism of plea bargaining has shifted from
the view that plea bargaining is inherently bad because it compromises
the state (see Arnold, supra; Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases,
1 So. CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1927)) to the view that plea bargaining is in-
herently bad because it coerces the defendant (see Note, The Uncon-
stitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1387 (1970)), its use
seems as widespread in the early 1900's as today. Concern over the
practice, in fact, led New York in 1936 to attempt to curtail it by re-
quiring prosecuting attorneys to submit the reasons for substituting a
lesser plea in writing. For an account of the success of that venture
see Weintraub & Tough, Lesser Pleas Considered, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CiuM-
INOLOGY 506 (1939).
35. See STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 33, at
1. The Task Force on Administration of Justice concluded in its study
of plea bargaining that in one half to two thirds of the arrests which are
actually prosecuted, 90 per cent of all convictions come from guilty
pleas in many courts. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 4. For
documentation of widespread use of the guilty plea in Massachusetts
murder cases see Carney & Fuller, A Study of Plea Bargaining in Murder
Cases in Massachusetts, 3 SUFFOLK L. REv. 292 (1968).
36. See NEWMAN, supra note 2, at 3; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
28, at 9; Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises By Prosecutors to
Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964).
37. Although it is authorized, the use of plea bargaining is not
mandatory, and some prosecutors and courts choose either not to use
any type of plea bargaining, or to use a modified form. An extensive
study of plea bargaining undertaken in 1964 indicated that a minority
of prosecuting attorneys do not engage in plea bargaining. Of 83 replies
to the surveys, a total of 11 (13.6 per cent) stated that they never en-
gaged in plea bargaining. Note, supra note 36, at 897.
While Enker notes that plea bargaining in federal courts generally
involves recommendations on sentencing rather than charge reduction
PLEA BARGAINING
types of plea agreements in which prosecutors traditionally have
engaged are permissible: a guilty plea to a lesser or related of-
fense, a guilty plea to one of multiple charges on the condition
that the others be dropped and a recommendation of sentence
or a promise not to recommend sentence to the judge. One type
of plea bargain not mentioned in proposed Rule 11 is "implicit
plea bargaining," a widespread custom among judges of giving a
lighter sentence after a guilty plea than for the same offense
after conviction at trial.s8 While critics see these implicit bar-
gains as an unconstitutional chilling of Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights,3 9 judges themselves differ on its propriety.40 Ap-
pellate courts have generally recognized and approved the prac-
tice when conducted within reasonable bounds.4 ' The American
Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards For Criminal
due to the fewer number of lesser related offenses included in federal
crimes (TASK FORCE RPoFr, supra note 28), a modification of general
plea bargaining used in the United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota in Minneapolis is contrary. Plea bargaining there exists
only in charge reductions-no bargaining is done on sentencing and no
recommendations for sentence are entered by the prosecutor. Minne-
apolis federal prosecutors believe that sentencing is a uniquely judicial
function and should be so reserved. Interview with Joseph Livermore,
Assistant United States Prosecuting Attorney, Minneapolis (Dec. 15,
1971).
38. Newman & NeMoyer, supra note 29, at 379; Note, The Influence
of the Defendant's Plea. on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE
L.J. 204 (1956).
39. See, e.g., Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83
HARv. L. REV. 1387 (1970).
40. Pilot Institute on Sentencing, Judicial Conference of the United
States, Proceedings, 26 F.R.D. 231 (1959). Judges at this conference dif-
fered over the use of implicit plea bargaining. While some felt that a
guilty plea should in itself have no effect on sentence, others believed
that it should be considered in some circumstances; the remainder be-
lieved leniency was always appropriate after a guilty plea. The Con-
ference as a whole concluded that
the court is justified in giving a lesser sentence upon a plea of
guilty than it would give upon a plea of not guilty upon con-
viction for the same offense, after a trial in which the testi-
mony of the accused is proved to be false or in which there is
some other circumstance chargable to the accused evincing a
lack of good faith.
Id. at 379-80.
41. In Dewey v. United States, 268 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1959), the
court took judicial notice of the custom of trial courts of imposing a
lighter sentence after a guilty plea than after the defendant had been
convicted for the same offense after trial. However, in United States v.
Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960), the court set aside a sentence which
clearly reflected punishment for going to trial. The court held that a
person could not be punished because he defended himself in good faith,
even if he was unsuccessful. This decision, however, did not prohibit
extra consideration being given to a defendant who does plead guilty.
See note 42 infra.
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Justice has approved the judge's consideration of the guilty plea
itself in reducing a defendant's sentence.4 2 The lack of reference
to implicit plea bargaining in proposed Rule 11 may result from
several factors: its essential difference from bargains struck be-
tween prosecution and defense; the differences of opinion within
the legal profession on its use; and the danger of appearing to
give the prosecution a larger hand in the function of sentencing.
Nevertheless, an affirmative statement that the judge could prop-
erly consider a guilty plea itself in reducing a defendant's sen-
tence, patterned on the American Bar Association model, would
be a valuable addition to proposed Rule 11. 4 3
Proposed Rule 11 (e) (1) specifies that the court shall not
participate in any plea discussions-a reflection of the view that
judicial participation in the formulation of a plea agreement
places intolerable pressure on a defendant to plead guilty. 4" Al-
though judges generally do not participate in plea discussions, 4"
appellate courts have been quick to condemn the practice and the
plea whenever any indication of judicial overreaching exists.40
42. STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 33. Under
Standard 1.8, the American Bar Association advocates that judges con-
sider certain factors in determining whether a reduction in sentence is
appropriate. The Standard makes it clear that judicial discretion should
be available to all defendants who plead guilty, not just to those who
engage in plea bargaining. Standard 1.8 (b), however, specifies that
the court should not impose on any defendant any sentence
in excess of that which would be justified by any of the re-
habilitative, protective, deterrent or other purposes of the crim-
inal law because the defendant has chosen to require the pros-
ecution to prove his guilt at trial rather than to enter a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere.
A standard which allows judicial discretion and yet maintains guide-
lines for the judges might contain the following:
If the agreed sentence appears within a reasonable range of an
appropriate sentence after trial, it should satisfy the need to
effectively deal with the offender yet not be an improper in-
ducement.
TASK FoRCE REPoRT, supra note 28, at 13.
43. See text accompanying notes 71-72 infra.
44. See Note, Official Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggestcd
Morals for a Marketplace, 32 U. CH. L. REv. 167, 171 (1964); Comment,
Duty of Trial Judge to Notify Defendant of Consequences of Guilty Plea,
19 S.C.L. REV. 261, 266 (1967); Comment, Judicial Plea Bargaining, 19
STAN. L. REV. 1082 (1967); FBA Convention Panel Discusses Judicial Role
in Plea Bargains, 5 CRi. L. 2453 (1969).
45. See Note, supra note 36, at 905. This survey resulted in find-
ings that judges were present at plea bargaining sessions in a substan-
tial minority of the cases; 32.3 per cent of the prosecutors responding
stated that judges were sometimes present at plea bargaining sessions.
See also NEWMAN, supra note 2 ,at 90-94, 103-130.
46. In Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957), the
court vaca'ed- a conviction when a judge warned the defendant that he
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The power and majesty of the judge, the courts have said, is so
inherently coercive that a plea agreement cannot be voluntarily
entered into by a defendant whose plea is produced at the sugges-
tion of the judge.47 A prior plea bargain confirmed by a judge,
however, has been approved by appellate courts.45
The role that the judge is to take under proposed Rule 11 is
set out in Subsection (e) (2):
Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been
reached by the parties which contemplates entry of a plea of
guilty in the expectation that a specific sentence will be im-
posed or that other charges before the court will be dis-
missed, the court shall require the disclosure of the agreement
in open court at the time the plea is offered. Thereupon the
court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its
decision as to acceptance or rejection until receipt of a pre-
sentence report.
This section reaches the heart of traditional criticism of plea bar-
gaining as a system in which the defendant makes an agreement
binding on himself but which may not be honored by the prosecu-
tion or the court. Because of the sub rosa nature of plea bargain-
ing and the requirements for a voluntary plea in current Rule 11,
the defendant has traditionally been forced to swear in court that
no promises were made to induce his guilty plea. While this ar-
rangement complied with Rule 11, it effectively blocked many
defendants' later attempts to appeal unkept plea agreements.49
In addition, judges often warn defendants that any prior promises
are not binding on the court, further reinforcing the record against
appeal, yet making little impact on defendants who had been fore-
should plead guilty because if he put the state to the expense of a trial
he would get the maximum punishment. In United States v. Tateo, 214
F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the court held that pressure by the judge
on the defendant negated that "freedom of will which is essential to a
voluntary plea of guilty." Id. at 567. "To impose upon a defendant
such alternatives amounts to coercion as a matter of law." Id. at 567.
In Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969), Chief Judge
Bazelon held that a trial judge should not be a party to plea bargaining.
See also Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950, 957 (5th Cir. 1967).
47. See note 46 supra.
48. Appellate -courts have held that a judge who undertakes to
explain the exact consequences of a plea agreement versus a plea of
not guilty is not necessarily putting undue pressure on the defendant.
If properly given, such warnings supply a fuller understanding of the
results of any plea. See, e.g., United States ex rel Rosa v. Follette, 395
F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel McGrath v. LaVallee, 319
F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963).
49. See Note, Plea Bargaining--Justice Off the Record, 9 WASHBURN
L.J. 430, 434 (1970). Proposed Rule 11 (g) requires a record of all pro-
ceedings, along with a verbatim account of the plea agreement and the
court's disposition of it. This requirement should aid appellate courts
in determining the merit of post conviction appeals.
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warned by their attorneys of the necessity of this ritual despite
the existence of a plea bargain. The end result was a mockery of
justice. The defendant and the prosecutor entered into a plea
bargain which was denied in court and by which the defendant
was bound, but which the prosecutor or court could abrogate with
impunity.50 When this inequality in bargaining position resulted
in the defendant's inability to enforce a plea agreement, it violated
the fundamental principle of fairness implicit in due process.'"
These new proposals eliminate both the unfairness to the de-
fendant and the hypocrisy of the plea acceptance. Plea agree-
ments would become a matter of open record before the court,
subject to judicial scrutiny. For the first time the judge would
be in a position to look at the nature of the plea agreement and
determine if the behavior of the prosecutor was so overreaching as
to render the plea unknowing or involuntary.52 The judge would
also be given the choice of deferring his decision on the plea until
he could study the presentence report, which because of a pro-
posed revision in Rule 32 would be available to him prior to the
acceptance of the plea.5 3 This change would allow a judge who
was uncertain of the propriety of the plea agreement to consider
such factors as prior offenses, work record and family history in
evaluation of the plea, and enable him to make a more informed
decision on whether to accept or reject the plea.
The provisions for acceptance or rejection of the plea agree-
ment and allowance for withdrawal of the plea if the court rejects
the agreement eliminate the present unfairness to the defendant
when he is bound by the guilty plea but the court is not. Proposed
Rule 11 (e) (3) and (4) provide as follows:
(3) Acceptance of Plea. If the court accepts the plea agree-
ment, the court shall inform the defendant that it will embody
in the judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the
plea agreement or another disposition more favorable to the de-
fendant than provided for in the plea agreement.
50. But see the discussion of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971), in note 57 infra.
51. See Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 452 (9th Cir. 1962).
52. The proposed rule contains no criteria for acceptance or re-
jection of the plea; this will be left to the discretion of the trial judges.
But see Judge Bazelon's opinion in Pettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d
651 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058 (1970), for a discussion
of the standards trial judges should employ.
53. Proposed Rule 32 (c) (1) (iv):
The report shall not be submitted to the court or its contents
disclosed to anyone unless the defendant has pleaded guilty or
has been found guilty, except that a judge may, with the con-
sent of the defendant, inspect a presentence report to de-
termine whether a plea argeement should be accepted pur-
suant to rule 11 (e) (3).
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(4) Rejection of Plea. If the court rejects the plea agree-
mert, the court shall inform the parties of this fact, advise the
defendant personally in open court that the court is not bound
by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to
then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that if he
persists in his guilty plea the disposition of the case may be less
favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea
agreement.
These provisions undercut a large body of criticism concerned
with the lack of protection for the defendant who pleads guilty.54
Under these provisions, the court must explicitly accept or reject
the plea agreement, informing the defendant immediately "
whether the bargain is to be upheld and giving him the opportun-
ity to withdraw his plea in the event the agreement is rejected.
The importance of such judicial supervision over the proce-
dural steps of plea bargaining was emphasized recently by the
United States Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York.0" The
majority held that a plea agreement must be kept; a defendant has
a right either to withdraw his plea or to obtain specific enforce-
ment of the plea agreement if it is violated.P7 Since the case
arose from a state decision, Federal Rule 11 technically had no
bearing on the decision. However, the decision is extremely rele-
vant in analyzing Federal Rule 11 and its proposed changes be-
54. Courts have generally allowed a defendant to withdraw a guilty
plea when an agreement with the court had been broken by the judge.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), which allowed withdrawal in such a case on grounds
that such a plea violated fundamental fairness and was involuntary.
However, appellate courts have split on whether a prosecutor's promise,
when broken, provides a basis for withdrawal of a guilty plea. Some
courts have found the plea to be voluntary, especially if the accused
was represented by counsel. More recent state cases, however, re-
quire the prosecutor's promise to be kept. See, e.g., People ex rel.
Valley v. Barman, 364 Mich. 471, 476, 110 N.W.2d 673, 676 (1961); Court-
ney v. State, 341 P.2d 610 (Okla Cr. 1959); NE-wviA, supra note 2, at
36; Note, Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas Under Rule 32 (d), 64 YALE L.J.
590 (1955).
55. The exception is when the judge waits until he sees the pre-
sentence report.
56. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
57. "When a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the in-
ducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Id. at 262.
Chief Justice ,Burger, writing for the majority, remanded the case to the
state court and left ultimate relief to the discretion of the state court.
Justice Douglas concurred, but urged that the state court should give
considerable weight to the defendant's preference: specific performance
or withdrawal of the plea. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stewart,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, concluded that when the de-
fendant requested that his guilty plea be withdrawn and his right to
trial reinstated, such relief should be given.
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cause, presumably, the federal courts will be subject to the same
requirements. Santobello requires that plea agreements be
kept, and proposed Rule 11 provides a means for judicial scrutiny
of the plea agreement and implementation of the agreement in
judgment and sentence. If the plea agreement is accepted, it
is immediately carried out in the sentence; if it is rejected, the
defendant has the opportunity to withdraw his plea-one of the
courses of action clearly approved by the Court in Santobello.
If the rule is violated by the judge,5 8 the defendant would be
entitled to vacate his plea and plead again, because the United
States Supreme Court has held that violation of Rule 11 con-
stitutes reversible error.59 Thus the procedure outlined in pro-
posed Rule 11 would be sufficient to comply with the new require-
ments laid down by the Court in Santobello.
One of the most significant sections of proposed Rule 11 (e)
is a provision in Subsection (3) which would allow the judge, in
his discretion, to make a more favorable disposition of the case
than the plea agreement provides. 0° This provision would furnish
58. For example, if the judge provides for a different disposition
than in the plea agreement and that disposition is successfully challenged
by the defendant as being less favorable to him than the plea agree-
ment, there would be a violation of Rule 11.
59. In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463 (1969), the
Supreme Court stated: "We hold that a defendant is entitled to plead
anew if a United States district court accepts his guilty plea without
fully adhering to the procedure provided for in Rule 11."
60. This opportunity for the defendant to be given only a more
favorable disposition of his case than provided in the plea agreement
or to be given the terms of the agreement itself is similar in effect to
the military plea agreement system. In use since 1953, the military
plea agreement system is based on a contractual agreement between
the defendant and the convening authority (the commanding officer
who institutes a court martial and who is required to give approval
to the sentence). It is entered into after a written offer to plead guilty
comes from the defendant and his counsel. The terms of the agreement
are written into the record and reviewed on appellate levels. The trial
judge, however, knows nothing of the agreement, and after hearing any
mitigating evidence, sets the sentence. If the sentence is harsher than
the agreement, the agreement prevails; if the sentence is more favorable
to the defendant, the trial judge's sentence prevails. A defendant may
withdraw his plea at any time prior to the final imposition of sentence.
Further safeguards have been provided by military appellate courts,
which have read ambiguous plea agreements against the government
rather than against the defendant, and by military review courts strik-
ing down plea agreements which infringe upon military due process-
such as agreements to waive rights to appeal, or agreements not to raise
certain issues at trial. United States v. Cummings, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 376,
38 C.M.R. 174 (1968); Lt. Infante, Avoiding the Pitfalls of PreTrial
Agreements, 22 JAG J. 3 (1967); FBA Convention Panel Discusses Ju-
dicial Role in Plea Bargaining, 5 CaRi L. 2453 (1969); JAG MANUAL §
.0109 Av(1) (c), (2) (d).
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the judge with an effective means of protecting the defendant
from prosecutorial overreaching short of rejection of the agree-
ment and plea itself. This protection could prove especially
valuable to the defendant who, because of inexperience or individ-
ual differences in counsel or prosecutors, has less opportunity to
bargain successfully than other defendants in similar circum-
stances.6 ' If the defendant accepted a plea agreement less favor-
able than the usual agreement reached by others in a similar situ-
ation, the judge would be allowed to make a more favorable dis-
position of the case than called for in the plea agreement. With-
out the explicit authorization of this provision, the judge might
feel compelled to reject a plea which he felt to be unfair to the
defendant and yet have no assurance that the defendant could
negotiate a better plea with the prosecutor.
Once a plea is rejected or withdrawn, the question of its later
use in evidence arises. Proposed Rule 11 (e) (6) specifies that:
[i]f a plea discussion does not result in a plea of guilty, or if a
plea of guilty is not accepted or is withdrawn, or if judgment
on a plea of guilty is reversed on direct or collateral review,
neither the plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea, or
judgment shall be admissible against the defendant in any crim-
inal or civil action or administrative proceeding.
This section would furnish the entire plea agreement procedure
with an atmosphere in which defense and prosecution could nego-
tiate without fear of any later use of the procedure as evidence
against the defendant. The proposal follows and expands an
early Supreme Court decision, Kercheval v. United States,0
2
which held evidence of a prior guilty plea inadmissible at trial.
Although a few states admit a withdrawn guilty plea into evi-
dence at trial as if it were any other utterance of the party, most
states follow the federal rule holding such records inadmissible.6 3
Overall, the proposed additions to Federal Rule 11 would take
a long-standing criminal court practice and expose it to the light
of judicial scrutiny. They also would set up procedures for ex-
plicit acceptance or rejection of the plea and provide written
records of the proceedings. For the first time the judge would
be provided with an adequate basis to determine the voluntariness
of the plea in view of the bargain struck between the defense and
prosecution. The proposals would provide a check on prosecutor-
ial pressure through exposure of the agreement itself and through
61. See note 71 infra.
62. 274 U.S. 220 (1942).
63. E.g., Kansas, Mass., and Neb. 4 J. WIGMoRE, A TamssE oN THE
ANGLO AMERIcAN SYSTEM OF EviDENCE iN TRALs AT ComoN LAW § 1067,
n.2 at 49 (3d ed. 1940, 1970 Supp.).
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judicial power to protect and favor the defendant without actual
rejection of the plea. Significant safeguards would be created for
both the defendant and the public in reaching fair and accurate
results.
IV. ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS FOR THE PLEA AGREE-
MENT PROCEDURE
Although the proposed rule provides needed changes, addi-
tional provisions could resolve some remaining problems. While
under proposed Rule 11 the defendant must be explicitly warned
of his waiver of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights accompanying
a guilty plea, such waiver occurs prior to any concrete knowledge
of the nature and extent of the prosecution's case against him.
This situation enables a prosecutor to bargain with defendants
whom he could not convict at a trial. Thus a weak case may serve
as the prosecutor's motive for seeking a plea agreement.
In view of the constitutional right of the defendant to put
the prosecution to its proof, such a purpose behind prosecutorial
bargaining is unacceptable. The President's Commission on Law
Enforcement 64 recognized that one of the major problems of the
current plea bargaining system is that it occurs when knowledge
of the opposing party's case is fragmentary.65 Professor Donald
Newman, in his most recent study of plea bargaining, 60 acknow-
ledged the necessity for plea agreements but concluded that they
should never be used simply because the prosecutor has a weak
case.6 7 The dangers of coercion of innocent defendants increases
as the strength of the prosecutor's case declines, and under our
current system of criminal justice, even the guilty defendant has
a right to force the prosecution to prove his guilt.
An effective method of dealing with this problem would be to
revise the discovery provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 16 to allow the defendant to discover before pleading what
he is now allowed to discover only before trial: written state-
ments from the defendant, medical and scientific examination re-
ports and names and statements of government witnesses. This
revision would enable the defendant to examine the prosecution's
case against him and would provide him with enough facts to
make an informed decision whether to waive his Fifth and Sixth
64. TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28.
65. Id. at 11.
66. Newman & NeMoyer, Issues of Propriety in Negotiated Justice,
47 DENva L.J. 367 (1970).
67. Id. at 400.
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Amendment rights.68 This discovery rule would act as a check
on a prosecutor who uses plea bargains to cover his lack of con-
vincing proof and would lessen the danger of coercing a false
guilty plea from a defendant who believes a jury might be con-
vinced of his guilt despite his actual innocence. While such a de-
fendant could still choose to plead guilty, he would be making his
decision with full knowledge of his position.
While such pre-plea discovery could lead to a reduction in
the number of those who plea bargain as the uncertainty of trial
results is reduced, it would eliminate only those plea bargains
where the prosecutor's case would not be convincing to a jury-
the very cases that should not be bargained.69 Some defendants
would refuse to plea bargain on the basis of information gained
through such discovery, but others might well be persuaded that
the prosecution's case against them was sufficiently strong to
convict them, and would decide to bargain rather than face the
jury.
Extending discovery to pre-plea proceedings could mean that
the defendant's evidence would also be subject to discovery; thus
the prosecution would be able to more fully evaluate its case.
When discovery by the prosecutor reaffirms the strength of his
case, his bargaining position is equally and justifiably strengthen-
ed. However, when such discovery indicates major flaws in the
prosecution's case, it would force the prosecutor to reexamine his
case, not just in regard to success at trial, but in consideration of
the possibility of prosecutorial error which might result in dismis-
sal of the case. The adversary system of criminal justice must
bow to the overriding purpose of convicting only the guilty; the
fuller use of discovery promotes this end.7 °
Another problem with proposed Rule 11 involves the inequal-
ity of treatment between those who plead guilty because of a plea
agreement with the prosecution and those who plead guilty with-
out such a plea agreement. According to several studies, defend-
68. See Comment, Preplea Discovery: Guilty Pleas and the Likeli-
hood of Conviction at Trial, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 527 (1971), for a thorough
discussion of this proposal.
69. See, e.g., Newman & NeMoyer, supra note 66; TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 28.
70. This discussion does not attempt to reach the traditional argu-
ments against criminal discovery: that discovery gives too great an ad-
vantage to the accused, that discovery can lead to tampering with evi-
dence and suborning witnesses, and that in the adversary system of
criminal justice discovery cannot be fair because of the limits imposed
by the right against self-incrimination. See, D. LoUtsELL, MODERN CALW-
ORNiA DiscovERY § 13.01 (1963).
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ants who enter guilty pleas without prior bargains are the young
and inexperienecd in criminal courts-the defendants most de-
serving of judicial lenience, but the ones least likely to receive it
because they have not made a plea agreement with the prosecu-
tor.7 1 This problem of inequitable treatment among similar de-
fendants because of differences in bargaining experience or at-
torneys could be resolved by the adoption of a provision such as
the American Bar Association Standard For Pleas of Guilty 1.8
(Consideration of Pleas in Final Disposition), which provides in
part:
(a) It is proper for the court to grant charge and sentence
concessions to defendants who enter a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere when the interest of the public in the effective ad-
ministration of criminal justice would thereby be served.
Among the considerations which are appropriate in determining
this question are:
(i) that the defendant by his plea has aided in ensuring
prompt and certain application of correctional measures to
him;
(ii) that the defendant has acknowledged his guilt and
shown a willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct;
(iii) that the concessions will make possible alternative cor-
rectional measures which are better adapted to achieve re-
habilitative, protective, deterrent or other purposes of cor-
rectional treatment, or will prevent undue harm to the de-
fendant from the form of conviction;
(iv) that the defendant has made public trial unnecessary
when there are good reasons for not having the case dealt
with in a public trial;
(v) that the defendant has given or offered cooperation
when such cooperation has resulted or may result in the
successful prosecution of other offenders engaged in equally
serious or more serious criminal conduct;
(vi) that the defendant by his plea has aided in avoiding
delay (including delay due to crowded dockets) in the
disposition of other cases and thereby has increased the
probability of prompt and certain application of correctional
measures to other offenders.
This standard authorizes judicial discretion in granting sen-
tence and charge reduction to defendants who plead guilty or nolo
contendere based on consideration of benefits to the public be-
cause of his plea. Such a provision is somewhat similar to the
broad grant of discretion given to the judge in proposed Rule 11
(e)--discretion to grant a more favorable disposition than the
plea agreement provides. However, the crucial difference is that
the proposed Rule 11 grant of authority applies only to those
71. Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bar-
gain Justice, 46 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956). This problem has been
set out more recently in TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 11.
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cases where plea bargains have been made. The American Bar
Association Standard would allow a judge to treat any defendant
who pleads guilty as if he had plea bargained and therefore would
allow reduction of his sentence or charge in any circumstances
which warranted lenience. As an explicit authorization to all
judges that such factors may be properly considered in deter-
mining sentence, 72 such a provision would be a valuable addition
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
72. See note 40, supra, for divisions among judges on the limits on
their discretion in this area.
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